I take a qualified if not agnostic position, believing, for example, that inference is above all something that is done (Winch 1992) , meaning that a logic cannot 'take you by throat' and necessarily force agreement with its particular rules. To accept a proposition is to choose, or, in a more civilized -or multi-polar -world, to be persuaded. It follows, for me, that, rather than advancing clear yes or no answers to how persuasive or unpersuasive certain economic arguments are, it is wiser to present a discussion. I have found also that this approach has practical and concrete significance in the preparation and delivery of policy advice. It is unwise to give suggestions too readily, partly because people often react adversely to unwarranted certainty, and partly because they have learnt from bitter experience that confidently expressed advice has often turned out to be wrong. It is often useful to phrase policy advice in terms of the 'contingent' -for example, an openness policy may work in societies of type X, but not in societies of type Y.
In this paper I discuss two significant issues: the assumption of homogeneity, and an example of how economists have responded to contradictory evidence related to this assumption. My interest in the second is partly because this informs others' judgments of us as applied economists. I start, though, by discussing why this assumption is interesting.
Economics
Economics forms one of the central disciplines of modern social science. Examination
of textbooks shows that economic theory makes strong assumptions about what does
and what does not vary in the populations it studies: micro economics deals with consumers, firms and commodities; macro economics with nations, GDP and so on.
For example, the behaviour of consumers, is, at least initially, discussed in abstraction from their gender, age and culture; the relationship between trade and growth is discussed in abstraction from issues such as historical context, culture and so forth. Of course, these issues can be and are brought into the analysis, but normally as a second step, and there is a strong tendency within economic theory to use models that are highly 'universal'. 1 There is a tendency to assume 'homogeneity', or, more precisely, 'ontological and epistemological universalism': I call this the 'homogeneity assumption'. 2 I discuss these terms below. There is a long history of arguments that criticize this approach a priori. These have not on the whole been found persuasive. In this paper, however, I discuss empirical work that implies a need to reconsider heterogeneity.
The 'homogeneity assumption', and the associated universalism, encourages lack of self-awareness, and so economics faces problems with negotiating disciplinary boundaries. 3 The assumption discourages dialogue since it must, if applied consistently, downplay the differences that other disciplines treat as central: cultural meanings, socially constructed institutions, gender, historical change, and so on.
Economic judgments risk losing their persuasiveness, for, too often, the 'homogeneity assumption' is used without being justified empirically. Further, in statistical work, assuming in a technical sense that a sample is drawn from a homogeneous population, so as to apply a theory that assumes such homogeneity, may risk presenting spurious statistical results, when significance tests assume homogeneity to exist, yet it does not.
I discuss this further below.
I argue, therefore, that poor attention to the negotiation of disciplinary boundaries is an indicator of deeper problems reflected in method and the treatment of data, and in a still rather underdeveloped ability to shift between universal and local explanatory frameworks. Until the issue of disciplinary boundaries is resolved, these weaknesses in generating persuasive arguments will likely therefore remain.
My examination of the literature suggests, albeit weakly, that while there are pressures within the discipline to move away from the 'homogeneity assumption', these remain fragile.
It seems unwise to teach theory when the teacher knows, and the literature shows, that it is badly supported by the data. This holds more forcibly for policy advice, especially that given to foreigners, who often will argue strongly for their being different from oneself. Persuasion seems often to require an overt acceptance of
difference. Yet, consistent with the 'homogeneity assumption', economists usually assert the existence of cause-effect policy outcomes based upon a posited universal 'economic logic' applying across countries and time.
Basic issues and two core propositions
'Reversals' and the history of economics Goldfarb 1997, in However, he asserts that the exact ways in which data influences beliefs is not clear, and that 'the relative fragility of empirical findings suggested by the existence of so many (emergent recalcitrant results) makes it more likely that theoretical preconceptions will be relatively impervious to empirical onslaughts' (238).
This view is both too pessimistic and too optimistic. The work on cross-country regressions discussed below presents profoundly negative results. One possibility is that these should lead economists to abandon the general 'homogeneity assumption' in their analyses and move to other analytical frameworks. One way of discussing what these might be is to propose that they should be thought of as 'contingent', by which I intend to suggest a far greater attention to the notion that the fundamental causal relations between the standard economic variables be, early on the analysis, taken to vary across contexts. I will come back to this later. Conversely, though, I
propose that we should only rarely and deliberately (when there is good empirical reason) adopt universalistic underlying assumptions. 5 That is, the results are useful in telling us that the world is not one best modeled using uncontingent approaches.
Goldfarb is thus too pessimistic in failing to see just how much of value the weak empirical foundation of much current economics is actually telling us. And he is too optimistic, in using a framework for analyzing economists' practice that does not reach very far outside economics.
However, he may be more correct in moving towards a 'dualistic' characterisation of economists' results. That is, reality can sometimes be shown empirically to be consistent with analysis based upon assumptions of homogeneity. At other times, it needs contingent approaches based on heterogeneity assumptions.
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A crucial point, already mentioned, is that positing universally valid relationships implies an assumption of homogeneity. There is, it would seem, likely to be a relationship between this and the statistical methods used in subsequent investigations of its statistical validity. Whilst the relationship between assuming homogeneity in analysis and the technical meaning of homogeneity in econometrics is not simple, it seems not unlikely that lack of clarity here may easily generate spurious posited relationships. Further, these may end up only tested through approaches, such as robustness tests, that in effect force the explanatory framework to confront its most basic assumptions. So long as that is not done, the weak empirical basis for theory may remain very hard to appreciate.
Two propositions
I develop my discussion of the 'homogeneity assumption' by using two core propositions, both empirically testable. The first, from macro economics, is that across countries and time there exist robust relationships between policy and outcomes. This is denied empirically by the now classic article by Levine and Zervos 1993 looking at data, in ways that their reviewers accepted. Within econometrics viewed as a science, if their methods could be subject to criticism as the discussion proceeded, this does not necessarily imply that they were doing 'bad' econometrics. The central issue, which I believe was put squarely on the table by their work, is the extent to which economics as practised is aware of the implications of underlying assumptions; the response to their paper tells us something about this.
There has, indeed, been a range of comments on the methods used in their paper.
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These are useful, in that, like the arguments relating to 'ontological and epistemological universalism', energise the question of the risks that analysis faces if it does not engage with 'homogeneity'. Coming at the issue from the perspective of statistical theory and practice, these tend to argue that the issue is that tests for statistical homogeneity exist, but tend to be ignored. My own look at citations of Levine and Zervos suggests that this is indeed the case. Thus, a deeper problem with their approach is that it was interpreted as offering techniques for checking 'robustness' that could produce better results without addressing the underlying homogeneity issue.
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But the point stands. Second, persuasive rational arguments about 'reality' need not just be based upon econometrics.
I turn now to look at insights from outside the discipline. This helps place the reactions to Levine and Zervos into context; more importantly, it shows the value of inter-disciplinary interaction.
The 'homogeneity assumption' from non-economic perspectives
The 'homogeneity assumption' is, by the current standards of other disciplines, somewhat extreme, and as such very interesting. In some areas of anthropology and post-development studies, for example, the common view is that knowledge is 'relative ': that reported 'truths' are no such thing, rather reflections of the perspectives of those who articulate them, and indeed that positions that argue for reality as having some essential nature are best viewed as reflecting relations of power, domination etc.
A classic retort, also made to Ayer's Language, Truth and Logic, is that such views are as absolute and certain as those which they attempt to criticise. Further, the empirical basis of such statements is frequently thin in the extreme. Thus, I have heard students regard much of the mainstream development policy literature as 'statist and realist', with pejorative connotations. Some argue, further, that policy, when actually observed, is inherently incoherent (Wright 1997) . One danger here is that reasonable scepticism becomes 'post-Modernist' nihilism that dismisses almost any reference to data.
Kenny and Williams 2001 argue from a methodological perspective that behind this
econometrics is a combination of epistemological and ontological universalisms: the ideas that people can be understood the same way, and are everywhere the same:
rocks are rocks are rocks. In other words, that the 'homogeneity assumption' holdsthe sample is drawn from a single population.
Like Levine and Zervos, and Rodriguez and Rodrik, Kenny and Williams point out that:
Overall, attempts to divine the cause or causes of long-term economic growth, testing a wide range of possible determinants using statistical techniques, have produced results … that are frequently contradictory to results reported elsewhere. That is, empirical evidence is hardly unanimous in support of a particular view of the growth process (1).
However, they are coming at the matter from different tacks. Levine and Zervos stress that there are very few -but not necessarily no -robust relationships observable between policy indicators and growth; for them, such relationships are possible.
Kenny and Williams, however, argue that there is no agreement, and that this implies, more profoundly, that basic assumptions are likely to be awry.
By the end of the decade expressions of the fundamental issues raised by Kenny and
Williams were increasingly coming from within the econometrics literature itself. In 2000, Brock and Durlauf, in a piece intended for the World Bank Economic Review, echoed Kenny and Williams by arguing that the assumption of parameter heterogeneity is insufficiently discussed (9):
…economic theory does not imply that individual units ought to be characterized by the same behavioural functions. … it is a matter of judgment when homogeneity assumptions are or are not to be made. Our contention is that the assumption of parameter homogeneity seems particularly inappropriate when one is studying heterogeneous objects such as countries. … reporting … based on the assumption that all countries obey a common linear model may understate the uncertainty present when the data are generated by a family of models. (Emphasis added)
Now, it is all very well stating that assumptions are a matter of judgment, but how is one to judge whether these judgments result in persuasive positions, or not?
A useful natural science example comes from fluid dynamics. Gas flow can be modeled in different ways. A crucial distinction is made between laminar flow and turbulent flow. 11 Precise reference to empirical conditions is given to guide which model is to be used. Each 'homogeneity assumption' holds within certain empirically defined limits; there are theories that explain when those limits are reached, and when a different model is to be used. This example shows how different explanatory frameworks can be bounded by empirical statements. This suggests that one way of deciding whether to be persuaded or not is to ask whether the choice of model is empirically based, or not: one very different alternative, all too familiar from much econometric work, is algebraic tractability.
Back to economics: what can be learnt from this excursion beyond disciplinary boundaries?
On my reading, Levine and Zervos do not suggest that there is a fundamental methodological problem in the assumption of a homogenous sampled population.
Rather, for them, the issue is the failure so far to establish robust relationships. One can read into this a concern that the basic homogeneity assumption may not hold, but that this is not their point. These eleven, one third of the citations, maintain the belief that cross-country regressions deliver plausible statements about relationships; they do not mention the possibility that the underlying 'homogeneity assumption' is implausible. They continue with cross-country regression analys is, and usually do not apply robustness tests (see Table 1 ).
B. Those who large disregard these methodological implications, but respond to some degree, usually by applying robustness tests after Levine and Zervos or Levine and Renelt. Total -11.
This second group, again about one third of the citers, tend to apply robustness tests as a way of generating 'good results' (see Table 2 ). These researchers appear to view the robustness tests offered by Levine and Renelt as offering a way around the apparently negative results of Levine and Zervos.
C. Those who accept the methodological implications, and work around them by dealing with the empirics of contingency. Total 7.
This group, around one quarter of the researchers, points in various ways to 'reversal', and how to move away from the 'homogeneity assumption'. Wood has some particularly interesting remarks. See Table 3. 14 D. Those who accept and discuss these implications, and perhaps use fundamentally altered approaches. Total -1. See Table 4 .
E. Citations of Levine and Zervos for other reasons not relevant for the implicit
fundamental methodological issue. Total -3. See Table 4 .
Conclusions from the data: reactions to Levine and Zervos in the discipline
This survey suggests that the fundamental implications of Levine and Zervos, after a short lag, have started to push themselves to the surface, and so a 'reversal' may be coming. But work that squarely addresses this issue, and would be capable of a dialogue with scholars outside or on the border of the discipline (such as Kenny and Williams) remains in a minority -perhaps one quarter to one third in total. This suggests that the challenges of abandoning the 'homogeneity assumption' are formidable.
Rather than confronting the evidence for major problems, which relate both to the 'sociology of knowledge' issue (Kenny and Williams) as well as to basic statistical method (Brock and Durlauf) , the citations data shows that the majority of the profession has gone around them. The dominant trend has been to continue to seek results based upon the assumption that samples are drawn from a single population. A minority, though, has sought a more local and contextual approach, as the quote from Wood (fn. 14) shows. This points to an emergent 'reversal', if not yet strong, but whilst the direction is obvious the challenges are vast and far from fully taken on. The persuasiveness of economic judgments, therefore, remains weakened by the lack of agreement and reliable empirics.
I turn now to my second core proposition, relating to micro economics.
Some evidence related to micro economics: the issue of universals, whether epistemological or ontological, in comparative economic behaviour
Introduction
The cross-country regressions literature discussed above encourages reflection on the question of universals within macro economics. Other useful empirical evidence supports assumptions of heterogeneity and contingent explanatory frameworks in the context of micro economics. The evidence on gender and cultural differences is interesting.
Experimental economics is a remarkable source of empirical arguments. It has been around a long time (Roth 1995) , but seems only recently to have examined issues of universality. Roth, like many others, points to a wide range of evidence that should suggest scepticism about the empirical support for the behavioural assumptions of much of modern microeconomics. This is certainly a telling point -Jehle and Reny 1998, a standard textbook, is strikingly data-free, particularly so in the area of the empirical limits to the applicability of the standard behavioural models. 15 Camerer, in Hagel and Roth 1995, concludes from a wide ranging review of results:
The studies reviewed in this section suggest a variety of broad classes of anomalies of the standard utility theories under risk and uncertainty. …These phenomena … suggest that people use simple procedures to make choices, constructing their preferences from procedural rules rather than maximising over well-formed preferences. (673) 16
To stress the point: in standard economics textbooks, argument based upon data is not developed by analogy to the natural sciences: 'this model works here, that model works there'. One way amongst others into this is to stress, as Simon 1986, the assumption of 'ins trumental rationality': that the subjectivity of the objects under study is not relevant to the method of analysis. The local meanings of economic phenomena are then not believed needed for the analysis to be persuasive. It follows from this that it is not so necessary for economists to report, unlike natural scientists, that 'this model works here, that model works there'. I examine this further below.
The experimental economics literature is rich and diverse. Indeed, it can appear to provide a support for much of the standard framework (eg Bergstrom and Miller 2000) . This work examines gender and cultural differences in behaviour, and adds to the weight of other econometric studies.
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Gender
Econometricians often report that models of male wage determination simply 'do not work' when applied to women. 18 Eckel and Grossman 1998 make similar points (see also Eckel and Grossman forthcoming 2004) .
Research in every other social and behavioural science indicates substantial differences in the behaviour of men and women in noneconomic settings. The general conclusion drawn from this work is that women are more socially-oriented (selfless) and men are more individually-oriented (selfish). If these differences survive in economic decisions, when money is at stake, then theories that model agents as homogeneous, or drawn from a common distribution, may predict behaviour inaccurately. If instead the differences in behaviour are overwhelmed by monetary incentives, then economic decisions are fundamentally different from those examined in other social and behavioural sciences. (1998:726) Their work sought to isolate gender differences. They attempted to isolate factors such as risk aversion and ways in which women react differently to the experimental conditions. This was done by retaining gender anonymity for both the partner and the experimenter. The results suggested that women were less selfish than men, which they term a 'baseline difference'.
In terms of the wider argument here, this suggests that the standard constrainedmaximization model of behaviour is more incorrect for women than it is for men, since altruism is usually absent from this model. Plott and Smith (forthcoming 2004) survey differences between the economic decisions of men and women. They conclude that risk levels are a core influence upon choice of behavioural model ('this model works here, that model works there').
Systematic differences are only revealed when subjects are not exposed to risk. Then, the choices women make are less individually-oriented and more socially-oriented.
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Note, though, that the concept of 'risk' is treated here as a universal, situated within
Simon's sense of an 'instrumental rationality' (see above) within which local meaning is not significant.
Cultural differences
Apart from difference in behaviour based upon gender, what can be found about variation due to 'culture'? Experimental economics also throws light upon differences here.
Henrich et al 2001 looked at fifteen small-scale societies. Based upon standard economic experiments, they conclude that the 'Economic Man model is not supported in any society studied', that the main variation was between groups (rather than between individuals); and that behaviour in the experiments was generally consistent with economic patterns of everyday life in these societies.
In other unpublished work, Henrich and Smith (mimeo n/d) compare Latin American and US subjects' behaviour. They conclude that they find more evidence than earlier studies that inter-group characteristics are of considerable importance, and that variation in individual attributes is of less significance to explaining differences. For them, as would be expected from such ethnographically-informed accounts, differences in economic life are mainly group-based.
Cameron 1999 reaches similar conclusions. She argues that increased stakes (thus responding to Eckel and Grossman's point about the effects of large monetary stakes on 'swamping' standard models of behaviour) move behaviour further from the standard game-theoretic norms and towards procedural solutions such as a 50:50 split.
A comment on cultural differences can also be found in Henning-Schmidt et al mimeo n/d. Here, based upon analysis of videotapes of experiments in negotiation, they conclude in a comparison of Chinese and German subjects that, in a stylised game, cultural differences were high. Confirming the discussion above, individual differences could be insulated from the data, and the analysis could thus bring out differences between the groups, categorised as 'cultural'.
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The referential empirical base of experimental economics is interesting, but, unlike natural sciences, still does not point very clearly to where, empirically and in a measurable manner, boundaries between different sets of behavioural assumptions are to be found. It does, however, point to their existence. This existence may then be presented, in the context of policy advice, as a basis for developing the 'contingent' nature of policy advice: with specific cultural and gender contexts (e.g. the specific gender division of labour), the consequences of policies can be argued persuasively to differ across time and place.
Disciplinary boundaries -reflections on neoinstitutional economics, instrumental rationality and universalistic assumptions
There is thus reason to conclude that much empirical work in economics is not very effective in persuading the acceptance of assumptions of universality: economic change varies in its essence too much across countries, and so the cross-country econometrics based upon homogeneity leads to disagreement rather than convergence.
Evidence on gender and culture also suggests caution. What are the alternative ways forward?
The discussion so far, and especially the citations of Levine and Zervos, suggests that the homogeneity assumption in fact creates great difficulties for economics. How can economics negotiate the limits of homogeneity, or more precisely what Kenny and Williams refer to as the assumption of epistemological and ontologic al universalism?
More fundamentally, how can it seek a basis for persuasive judgements as to where those limits are -that is, when is that assumption reasonable? Further, the discussion suggests that we can learn from the opportunities to get 'out of the box' offered by disciplines other than economics, which have therefore become more relevant to the search for persuasive economic arguments. 21 Whether and how this happens, is in part an empirical question. This argues that we should watch closely the negotiation of disciplinary boundaries as an indicator of the evolving practice of economics. Here the sub-discipline of neo-institutional economics provides an illuminating example.
The rise of neo-institutional economics has been marked by the award of the Nobel Prize for Economics to one of its major practitioners, Douglass C. North. A useful point here is to consider how certain North is that economics can explain change. He states that what is needed is the rejection of 'instrumental rationality', which rejection is, he argues, key to the success of neo-institutional economics as he seeks to practise it. By 'instrumental rationality' he means the idea that "it is not necessary to distinguish between the real world and the decision-maker's perceptions of it" and, "that it is possible to predict the choices that will be made by a rational decision-maker entirely from a knowledge of the real world and without a knowledge of the decision-makers perceptions or modes of calculation" (2).
here, given the discussions of econometrics and experimental economics above, is that perceptions may have both local and universal characteristics, and the distinction is there to be appreciated and negotiated.
This does not, as Bates would have it, simply seek to expand the realm to be explained by economics; rather, it seeks to establish where those boundaries may be, and then to negotiate. A classic study by economists of English state finance (North and Weingast 1989) must clearly confront the arguments of historians and other noneconomists who have access to analytical frameworks and data unavailable to the authors. The reader must then decide among these competing approaches, perhaps taking pieces from each. In this way economics may find itself interesting and persuasive to non-economists, and vice versa.
North attributes his views to Simon 1986 . Arrow 1986 , in the same collection as 
Conclusions
There are strong empirical arguments which suggest that economists should think far more about just what they are doing when they adopt the 'homogeneity assumption'.
For macro economics, I argue that the failure of the cross-country regression work to produce clear and agreed results needs to be given serious thought, and that a significant minority of economists have done so. The evidence I have examined related to micro economics is far weaker, but points in the same direction, to the need to ponder on exactly what is being done when assumptions of 'epistemological and ontological universalism' are made.
Following Winch's position that such ponderings are the 'doing' of something, are social activities and bearing in mind that economics is a discipline, it follows that such ponderings need to be made to happen: the assumptions must be questioned, whether in seminars, reviews of papers or wherever the self-policing of the discipline happens.
Whether in terms of the universalism of analytical frameworks, or the statistical testing of the homogeneity of sampled populations, failure to identify these positions as assumptions, and to question them as such, risks much. Most importantly, in a world that is not only increasingly diverse, but in an academic universe increasingly permeated by antipathy to rigorous empirical investigation as economists understand it, failure to do so greatly weakens the wider persuasive power of results.
The econometrics and experimental work discussed shows that there is much to be learnt from this empirical literature. The assumption of homogeneity is not inherently unreasonable, yet articles such as Levine and Zervos, papers such as Rodriguez and Rodrik 1999 and others provide a basis for reflecting on the wisdom of it. Two simple but tricky questions remain -where does this assumption come from and is it persuasive because empirically justified?
I believe it is unreasonable to retreat, as is common in many social sciences, to some a-factual post-Modernist world. Moreover, as the citations survey showed, many economists are aware of these issues and a minority is explicitly trying to do something about it.
'Reversal'? What does the data suggest should be done?
Growing awareness of the existence and nature of the 'homogeneity assumption' seems crucial to a 'reversal'. Yet, my review of citations of Levine and Zervos shows that only limited progress has been made in this direction: people are aware of the issue, and are trying to find ways of dealing with it, but they are a minority. The simplest reason is most likely the sheer scale of the task of creating economic theory that can handle heterogeneity.
This suggests, pace Goldfarb, a 'reversal' that can be sensed 'in the egg' even if it may in fact never arrive. In the cross-country research examined, a research program has generated results that challenge an assumption thought to be so fundamental and unquestioned that the research projects of the program did not test it. Yet it appears that the program can and did. Further, the work of Hendry and others argues that there exist techniques of econometrics that would have permitted testing of this assumption.
If this view is correct, then what has happened can be put simply. First, adopt the 'homogeneity assumption' for your theory and empirics -you do not question or test this directly; second, generate a wide range of conflicting but apparently statistically correct results; third, draw from this the conclusion that some core assumption is awry, and look for it, using perspectives both inside and outside the discipline. In this case, the evidence points strongly towards the 'homogeneity assumption' as the culprit. What is interesting from this practice is that it seems that two necessary ingredients were, first, an empirical analysis that could address the stability of results (Levine and Zervos) combined with, second, inputs from outside the discipline (e.g. Kenny and Williams) that could critique the core aspects of the theory that were causing the problems. My review of the references to Levine and Zervos tends to show, however, that existing techniques within econometrics that could have tested for homogeneity were not used to engage with Levine and Zervos.
I find here the example from fluid dynamics discussed above both revealing and limiting. The normal practice in that discipline has been to rely upon the nature of the reality it has studied to establish well-negotiated boundaries between two different field s: laminar and turbulent flow. Levine and Zervos could have found many more robust relationships than they did, and then the negotiation of the relationships between global and local explanatory frameworks, between assumptions of homogeneity and their abandonment, could have been far easier. Yet they did not, and this is revealing. The comparison is limiting, though, in that the stuff of social science, and its inherent tolerance of long-lasting differences that would be quite unacceptable in natural sciences, means that the nature of methodological issues is far less straightforward.
The evidence presented above supports the view that there are moves in the direction of a 'reversal'. Abandonment of the 'homogeneity assumption' may be leading to a shift in analytical approach to one where the standard behavioural models are linked to data defining the limits of their applicability; similarly, the cause-effect relations that underpin the standard notion of policy could become seen as, in any particular context, dualistic: some follow universal logics, some local ones. The results I report from experimental economics also support such local arguments, for culture and gender differences do discourage use of analytical approaches that ignore such differences. In both instances, I would argue that progress will likely be marked by a more intense and meaningful negotiation of economics' disciplinary boundaries: what it can explain, what it cannot. However, there is a long way to go. And the world is becoming more diverse, and so persuasion, rather than authority, more important.
Policy and policy advice?
As a trained economist who has sought to offer policy advice on development I have had to face many of the problems discussed above. In my own experience, what makes the difference is the presentation of persuasive arguments in ways that command respect, and that this respect can usually only be won through a demonstrated familiarity with the institutional and other realities inhabited by one's interlocutors. Further, this can only be done through prolonged interaction and discussion. This is made more difficult if policy-makers have had to previously deal with unwise policy advice given too readily. The result has been that people have learnt to cope with prescriptions articulated with unwarranted certainty, and confront the bitter experience that confidently expressed advice often turns out to be wrong.
When they have learnt this, it may then be very hard to engage them in persuasive dialogue; they can, of course, like any human, smile and disregard what one says.
Granted that access, I have found that in practice it is actually rather easy to develop the combination of universalistic and particular analytical frameworks to which I have argued the data is pointing us, and to base these in plausible statements about where the empirically-founded boundaries between them are. Moving 'beyond the core' in this way seems to require great attention to local detail, which is in any case needed for persuasive policy advice. This search benefits from contact with other disciplines, and does not at all require abandoning the basic assumption, of 'agnostic realism', that is common to so much empirically based research. The point is not to give up, but to base persuasive arguments on models that work; clearly, many do not.
Yonay, Yuval P. , The struggle over the soul of economics, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1998. Easterly and Levine 1997 argue that "… the goal is not to establish 'robustness' as defined by Levine and Renelt (1992) " (1208).
Easterly et al 1997 simply quotes L&Z's positive results, relating to the "black market premium (which) has proven to be robustly correlated with growth performance in previous studies" (292) and then run a range of regressions to make their point, which is that the response of Latin American countries to reforms has "not been disappointing" (287).
Kim and Willett 2000:141: "Critics … point to findings that the estimated relationships were quite unstable … Such instability should not be surprising … (for) the reasons … are not well understood, and the relationship is far from being a tight mechanical one'.
Lee and Lee 1995:219 quote L&Z as an example of empirical research that uses measures of human capital that "are not directly linked to the notion of human capital" and then continue with their econometrics, without applying robustness tests.
Lindh and Lindstrom 1997:33 report L&Z's positive results (i.e. that "In cross-country regressions of growth, the positive correlation with financial development is one of the few findings that are robust to alternative sets of control variables").
Plane 1997:171 reports L&Z's positive results (i.e. that there is a "robust correlation between the ratio of investment to GDP and economic growth").
Sub-group -'Fence-sitters': cannot ignore L&Z, but apparently want to.
Dotsey and Sarte 2000:632 straddle the fence. Thus "In studying the effects of monetary policy on real growth, we desire a model that is consistent with a number of stylised facts … First, the model should display a negative relationship between average inflation and average growth. However, despite numerous studies on the link between …inflation … and growth, there still exists some controversy over the robustness of this relationship".
Shi 1999:99 reports the L&Z finding of the absence of any robust relationship between growth and inflation, positive or negative, and suggests that this may imply a non-monotonic relationship between aggregate capital/output and inflation (i.e., positive with low inflation and negative with high). For example, Bougheas, Demetriades and Mamuneas 2000 apply the robustness tests given in Levine and Renult, whilst Bruno and Easterly 1998:19-20 report "… in contrast to what is said by the existing literature, pooled cross-country datasets are not informative about what happens at lower ranges of inflation. In contrast, the data on discrete high inflation episodes speaks clearly -there is a strong and robust relationship between high inflation and growth" (emphasis added).
Cheshire and Magrini 2000:464-465 are an intriguing example of 'double think'. They conclude that the problem of instability of results as model specification changes is so great as to suggest that thes e methods be avoided; convergence estimates are dependent, not upon data, but upon model specification. Yet their approach to growth analysis is, like others, to 'add-in' novel explanatory variables, with universal character -"Magrini's model originated from the view that technological knowledge has a very important tacit component that has been neglected in formal theories of endogenous growth (455).
Clarke 1995 uses the robustness tests applied in Levine and Renult to argue that his result, that inequality is negatively correlated with growth, "is robust across different inequality measures, and to many different specifications of the growth regression" (403).
Kalaitzidakis, Mamuneas and Stengos, 2000, develop the Levine and Renult robustness check by assessing the robustness of models that include a common non-linear specification (L&Z only covered linear models).
Levine and Zervos 1996:332 simply refer to L&Z (and Levine and Renult 1992) as sources of techniques for assessing the robustness of relationships.
Mehlkop 2000 finds no robust effect of posited explanatory variables in his work, which thus negatively critiques another work cited.
Quinn 1997 uses the robustness tests applied in Levine and Renult "to increase reader confidence in the results" (531). He concludes that some policy measures are robustly associated with growth, in this sense with capital account liberalisation.
Seccareccia and Lavoie 1996 call for robustness testing. " … as L&Z (1993:430) affirm, "unless researchers study the sensitivity of their results to small variations in the sample of countries and changes in the conditioning information set, the results should be regarded with scepticism… Given the ravages of the zero inflation policy … how can the Bank of Canada base its continued high real interest-rate policy on such shady theory and evidence?" Amoateng and Amoako-Adu 1996:21 accept the strong warning implicit in L&Z, and shift the analytical approach to a focus upon causality. They conclude (26) that "(t)he evidence indicates that, generally, there is a joint feedback effect between export revenue, external debt service and economic growth".
Cheng and Hsu 1997:39 quote L&Z to confound their own analysis -"Another issue concerning regression specification is that these studies used cross-sectional data, which implicitly assumed the existence of an invariant cross-section relationship between human capital and economic growth … However, differences in the importance of effectiveness of education across countries defy this assumption. Thus, the results of causality tests depend very much on model specification".
Demetriades and Hussein 1996:387 present essentially negative results: "Our findings also clearly demonstrate that causality patterns vary across countries and, therefore, highlight the dangers of statistical inference based on cross section country studies which implicitly treat different economies as homogenous entities". They also suggest that the main explicit message of L&Z is the need to apply sensitivity analyses (390 fn 6), i.e. that the implicit methodological issue is hidden.
Hanushek and Kimko 2001:1185 "This paper addresses the measurement problem of labor-force quality directly ... we construct new measures of quality based on … various international tests of academic achievement … quality differences measured in this way prove to have extremely strong effects on growth rates".
Temple 2000:413. "We also know from Levine and Renult how sensitive results can be to the choice of specification. There is not much to be said here, except to note that inflation tends to emerge as particularly sensitive to the choice of control variables …". Emphasis added.
Wood 1994:67-68: "The value of this message is clear … None of us … will ever rely so casually and so heavily upon cross-country regressions. … (yet) I have a basic reservation about the methodology used, which is powerful but blunt." Comim 2000:162 looks at the activities of the cross-country growth research within a survey of the concept of applied economics, and points out that this field, reinforced by L&Z, has tended to examine issues such as robustness precisely because it "follows its own research agenda with much less influence from theoretical quarters than the influence generated by the neoclassical theories on applied studies".
little empirical relationship between empirical evidence and the acceptability of the rational expectations hypothesis (112). Compare this methodology with the more discourse-based approach of Yonay 1998 , in discussing the debates between neoclassical and institutional economists before WWII. 7 In my own teaching experience exposure to this work has a somewhat electric effect upon students both within and outside economics. This result is interesting. regard research as something that is human business, which may find the Truth, but can never be certain of it. To quote Hoover and Perez forthcoming: "We can never guarantee that the specifications selected by the general-to-specific approach are true. But the approach is part of a critical, indeed dialectical, methodology" (19). Interestingly, this work concludes that "What is surprising is how few of the variables matter in the end and how much is left unexplained. The preferred regression explains only 42 percent of the variability of countries' growth experiences …" (19). This could be taken to suggest that the rest of the story is 'contingent'; as I argue below, this conclusion, like others, points to a possible consensus that articulates agreement over cause-effect relations in terms of an amalgam of universalist and local relations: yes, we agree that these relations hold for all of us; yes, we agree that these other relations hold for the here and now, and not necessarily for others. This would seem a wise formula.
10 It seems to me that a proper awareness of the homogeneity assumption, refined and expressed in terms of statistical analysis -i.e. that the sample is drawn from a single population -is needed to make meaningful the statistical tests for parameter estimates. If it is unwarranted, and unless measures are taken to deal with this, significance results are literal non-sense. Thus the risk would be that a technique, if one could be found, for securing robustness would remain founded upon sand: the robust results would reflect random order … leading to a range of conflicting but significant results, as in the case of the cross-country regressions. Whether viewed as an issue in statistical analysis, or as a central assumption in the selection of analytical frameworks, the question of homogeneity is a valuable but (according to my own review of responses to Levine and Zervos under-used) check upon the degree to which positions that purport to be based upon empirical work should be taken as persuasive.
11 The significance of the transition from laminar to turbulent flow is that wings often stall when this happens, which can kill people. 12 The work surveyed covers a wide range, and I have had to be selective in the ways we have used it for this review. I apologise for any apparent misrepresentation, which is unintentional. 19 They discuss three types of experiments: Public Goods, Ultimatum and Dictator. On reflection, and granted that in many human societies women bear contingent liability in the case of local 'system breakdown' (ie for the children in the case of family break-up), it might be argued that their apparent selfishness when risks appear high is, rather, a qualitative shift in strategy reflecting a need to look after themselves so they can cope with the contingent liability. 20 Ethnographically, an interesting point here was the Chinese willingness to spend time exploring opponents' activities for signs of pre-known strategies, referenced to classic stories and literature on war and its standard stratagems. This the Germans did not seem to do. The interactions were videotaped. In terms of the discussion of instrumental vs procedural rationality, this would seem to be a clear example of search for procedures, and selection of responses in consequence, where knowledge of the local meaning was essential to any persuasive analysis.
